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Rudin  v. State, 120 Nev. Adv. Rep. 17, 86 P.3d 572 (2004).1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW 
Summary 
 
 Appellant Margaret Rudin (Rudin) married her husband, Ron, in September of 
1987.  In January of 1995, Ron’s remains were discovered at Lake Mohave, he 
apparently had been murdered.  Shortly after the discovery of her husband’s body, Rudin 
boarded a plane to St. Louis, Missouri. 
 On April 17, 1997, Rudin was indicted by the Clark County grand jury on three 
counts for (1) unauthorized surreptitious intrusion of privacy by listening device, (2) 
murder with the use of a deadly weapon and (3) accessory to murder.  A warrant was then 
issued for her arrest.  Rudin was subsequently apprehended in Massachusetts in 
November of 1999, and extradited to Nevada for trial.   
On March 31, 2000, Rudin was arraigned in the Eighth Judicial District Court.  
She pled not guilty to all counts.  Rudin retained Michael Amador (Amador) to defend 
her after a brief period of representation by the Clark County Public Defender.  Amador 
claimed to be working on a pro bono basis.  After several delays, on February 20, 2001, 
the district court appointed Thomas F. Pitaro (Pitaro) to assist Amador. 
Approximately one month later, Rudin moved for a mistrial based on the lack of 
preparedness by Amador.2  The district court denied the motion finding that there was not 
enough evidence of prejudice to warrant a mistrial.  Two weeks later, the district court 
appointed John Momot (Momot) as additional counsel for Rudin.     
 On May 2, 2001, after an eventful trial, Rudin was found guilty on counts I and II.  
On May 8, 2001, Rudin filed a motion for a new trial.  Rudin also moved to terminate 
Amador as her attorney based on alleged misconduct by Amador.3  The district court 
granted Rudin’s motion to terminate Amador as her attorney.  However, the court denied 
her motion for a new trial because Rudin did not present any specific evidence or 
argument to support that she was prejudiced at trial.   
 Rudin was subsequently sentenced to one year in prison on count I and to life in 
prison with the possibility of parole after ten years on Count II, plus an equal and 
consecutive sentence for a weapon enhancement.  Rudin appealed.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 By Mike Feliciano 
2 The motion was based on several acts committed by Amador including (1) an incoherent opening 
statement, (2) lack of preparation for the trial and (3) an improper examination of a witness. 
3 Rudin claimed that Amador had (1) abused drugs, (2) retained her personal possessions without her 
permission, (3) mishandled her defense, (4) secretly obtained media rights to the case while claiming to be 
working on a pro bono basis and (5) secretly released private information to tabloids without Rudin’s 
permission.   
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Issues and Disposition4  
 
Issue 
  
1. Must a trial court grant a motion for a mistrial in a criminal case when the 
defendant’s attorney was not prepared for trial? 
2. Must a trial court grant a motion for a new trial in a criminal case when the 
defendant’s attorney was not prepared for trial and the attorney had a conflict of 
interest with the defendant? 
 
Disposition 
 
1. No, a mistrial may be granted when prejudice occurs that prevents the defendant 
from receiving a fair trial.  Mere evidence of lack of preparation is insufficient; 
rather, the defendant must show that the attorney’s actions actually prejudiced the 
defendant’s case.   
 
2. No, a motion for a new trial may be granted when the record is sufficient to 
permit the conclusion that the attorney’s performance during trial was adversely 
affected by a alleged conflict of interest or that the attorney’s performance 
prejudiced the defendant’s right to a fair trial. 
 
Commentary 
   
State of the law before Rudin 
  
 In Nevada, the standard for a motion for a mistrial based on ineffective counsel is 
that the performance must be “so prejudicial as to be unsusceptible to neutralizing by an 
admonition to the jury.”5  The standard for a motion for a new trial based on a conflict on 
interest on the part of an attorney requires evidence that an attorney’s conflict of interest 
adversely affected the attorney’s performance.6 
      
The Holding in Rudin 
  
 Although the supreme court disagreed with the district court’s reasons for denying 
the motion for a mistrial, it did agree with the result.  This is because Rudin did not 
demonstrate that Amador’s performance was so prejudicial that an admonishment to the 
jury was not enough to rectify the problem.7  The district court repeatedly admonished 
Amador, granted requests for extra time during the trial and appointed Pitaro and Momot 
to assist Amador with the trial.  Based on these factors, the court found that Amador’s 
                                                 
4 Rudin raised several issues on appeal.  The supreme court quickly disposed of claims of (1) improperly 
admitting expert testimony, (2) prosecutorial misconduct, and (3) judicial misconduct.  The court 
concluded the foregoing claims were without merit.  These issues are not discussed herein.   
5 Allen v. State, 665 P.2d 238, 241 (Nev. 1983). 
6 Clark v. State, 831 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Nev. 1992). 
7 See Allen, 665 P.2d at 241. 
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conduct, although improper, did not rise to the level of ineffectiveness that warranted a 
mistrial.  This is because “[a] defendant is not entitled to a perfect trial, only a fair trial.”8    
 Regarding the motion for new trial, the court held that Amador’s actions were not 
enough to warrant a new trial because the mistakes were adequately addressed by the 
district court.  The appointment of Pitaro and Momot was also a factor that the court 
found was relevant in remedying Amador’s performance.     
 
The Impact of Rudin on Nevada Law 
 
 Rudin will result in less protection for defendants in criminal cases.  This is 
because it makes it more difficult for a criminal defendant to successfully assert that the 
defendant’s attorney was either ineffective or had a conflict of interest that resulted in an 
unfair trial.  For instance, the court was aware of improper conduct committed by Rudin’s 
attorney including failure to prepare for the case properly and a conflict of interest with 
Rudin.  If the court found that these factors were not enough to warrant a mistrial or new 
trial, this is evidence that the court will not do so in all but the most egregious cases of 
attorney misconduct.         
 
Unanswered Questions 
 
 The court held that the attorney misconduct in Rudin did not rise to the level to 
warrant a mistrial or a new trial.  The court did not articulate the factors that would 
warrant a mistrial or new trial.  In Rudin, the attorney’s conduct was undoubtedly 
improper.  However, without more guidance, it is difficult to determine what actions 
would warrant a new trial or mistrial.        
 
Survey of Law in Other Jurisdictions 
 
 The test for ineffectiveness of counsel stems from Strickland v. Washington, a 
United States Supreme Court decision that established a two-pronged test for 
ineffectiveness of counsel.9  Under the first prong of Strickland, the defendant must show 
that the attorney’s performance was deficient.10  This requires evidence that the attorney 
made errors so serious that the attorney was not acting as “counsel” as defined by the 
Sixth Amendment.11  Second, the defendant must show that the errors were so serious 
that they prejudiced the defense.12  This requires a showing that the errors were so serious 
as to render the trial unfair.13   
 The Strickland test is used by the majority of the states to determine effectiveness 
of counsel.  While the states have different nuances to the test, the main point is the same 
                                                 
8 Ennis v. State, 539 P.2d 114, 115 (Nev. 1975) citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974).    
9 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
10 Id. at 687.    
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
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as the factors above, that is, the attorney must have committed errors so serious as to 
render the representation ineffective.14                   
 
Conclusion       
  
 Rudin offered some, albeit limited, guidance as to the proper standard for a 
motion for a mistrial and a motion for a new trial.  Hence, the law is still unclear as to the 
proper standards. However, Rudin implies that the court will not grant a mistrial or new 
trial in all but the most severe cases of attorney misconduct.     
                                                 
14 See, e.g. People v. Ledesma, 729 P.2d 839 (Cal. 1987); State v. Nash, 694 P.2d 222 (Ariz. 1985); State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner, 94 P.3d 186 (Utah 2004).  
